53 lines
2.6 KiB
Plaintext
53 lines
2.6 KiB
Plaintext
Tech Note 0002
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How to avoid non-intrusive timing attacks with online computations
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Tom St Denis
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Introduction
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------------
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A timing attack is when an attacker can observe a side channel of the device (in this case time). In this tech note
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we consider only non-intrusive timing attacks with respect to online computations. That is an attacker can
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determine when a computation (such as a public key encryption) begins and ends but cannot observe the device
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directly. This is specifically important for applications which transmit data via a public network.
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Consider a Diffie-Hellman encryption which requires the sender to make up a public key "y = g^x mod p". Libtomcrypt
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uses the MPI bignum library to perform the operation. The time it takes to compute y is controlled by the number
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of 1 bits in the exponent 'x'. To a large extent there will be the same number of squaring operations. "1" bits in
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the exponent require the sender to perform a multiplication. This means to a certain extent an attacker can
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determine not only the magnitude of 'x' but the number of one bits. With this information the attacker cannot directly
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learn the key used. However, good cryptography mandates the close scrutiny of any practical side channel.
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Similar logic applies to the other various routines. Fortunately for this case there is a simple solution. First,
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determine the maximum time the particular operation can require. For instance, on an Athlon 1.53Ghz XP processor a
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DH-768 encryption requires roughly 50 milliseconds. Take that time and round it up. Now place a delay after the call.
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For example,
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void demo(void) {
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clock_t t1;
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// get initial clock
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t1 = clock();
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// some PK function
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// now delay
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while (clock() < (t1 + 100));
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// transmit data...
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}
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This code has the effect of taking at least 100 ms always. In effect someone analyzing the traffic will see that the
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operations always take a fixed amount of time. Since no two platforms are the same this type of fix has not been
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incorporated into libtomcrypt (nor is it desired for many platforms). This requires on the developers part to profile
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the code to determine the delays required.
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Note that this "quick" fix has no effect against an intrusive attacker. For example, power consumption will drop
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significantly in the loop after the operation. However, this type of fix is more important to secure the user of the
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application/device. For example, a user placing an order online won't try to cheat themselves by cracking open their
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device and performing side-channel cryptanalysis. An attacker over a network might try to use the timing information
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against the user.
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