Refactor process protection
This commit is contained in:
momo5502
parent
49d0528dfa
commit
3e95fe4344
@ -405,232 +405,140 @@ namespace Components
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}
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}
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// TODO: Beautify that
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DWORD AntiCheat::ProtectProcess()
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unsigned long AntiCheat::ProtectProcess()
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{
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// Returned to caller
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DWORD dwResult = (DWORD)-1;
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Utils::Memory::Allocator allocator;
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// Released on exit
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HANDLE hToken = NULL;
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PVOID pTokenInfo = NULL;
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PSID psidEveryone = NULL;
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PSID psidSystem = NULL;
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PSID psidAdmins = NULL;
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PACL pDacl = NULL;
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PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSecDesc = NULL;
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__try
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// If this fails, you can try to fallback to OpenThreadToken
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HANDLE hToken = nullptr;
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if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_READ, &hToken))
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{
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// Scratch
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DWORD dwSize = 0;
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BOOL bResult = FALSE;
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// If this fails, you can try to fallback to OpenThreadToken
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if (!OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_READ, &hToken))
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{
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(FALSE);
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__leave; /*failed*/
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}
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bResult = GetTokenInformation(hToken, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &dwSize);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(bResult == FALSE && ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER == dwResult);
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if (!(bResult == FALSE && ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER == dwResult)) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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if (dwSize)
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{
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pTokenInfo = HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, dwSize);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(NULL != pTokenInfo);
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if (NULL == pTokenInfo) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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}
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bResult = GetTokenInformation(hToken, TokenUser, pTokenInfo, dwSize, &dwSize);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(bResult && pTokenInfo);
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if (!(bResult && pTokenInfo)) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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PSID psidCurUser = ((TOKEN_USER*)pTokenInfo)->User.Sid;
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SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY sidEveryone = SECURITY_WORLD_SID_AUTHORITY;
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bResult = AllocateAndInitializeSid(&sidEveryone, 1,
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SECURITY_WORLD_RID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &psidEveryone);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(bResult && psidEveryone);
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if (!(bResult && psidEveryone)) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY sidSystem = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
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bResult = AllocateAndInitializeSid(&sidSystem, 1,
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SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &psidSystem);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(bResult && psidSystem);
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if (!(bResult && psidSystem)) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY sidAdministrators = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
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bResult = AllocateAndInitializeSid(&sidAdministrators, 2,
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SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID, DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS,
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0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &psidAdmins);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(bResult && psidAdmins);
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if (!(bResult && psidAdmins)) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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const PSID psidArray[] =
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{
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psidEveryone, /* Deny most rights to everyone */
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psidCurUser, /* Allow what was not denied */
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psidSystem, /* Full control */
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psidAdmins, /* Full control */
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};
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// Determine required size of the ACL
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dwSize = sizeof(ACL);
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// First the DENY, then the ALLOW
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dwSize += GetLengthSid(psidArray[0]);
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dwSize += sizeof(ACCESS_DENIED_ACE) - sizeof(DWORD);
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for (UINT i = 1; i < _countof(psidArray); i++)
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{
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// DWORD is the SidStart field, which is not used for absolute format
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dwSize += GetLengthSid(psidArray[i]);
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dwSize += sizeof(ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE) - sizeof(DWORD);
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}
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pDacl = (PACL)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, dwSize);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(NULL != pDacl);
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if (NULL == pDacl) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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bResult = InitializeAcl(pDacl, dwSize, ACL_REVISION);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(TRUE == bResult);
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if (FALSE == bResult) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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// Mimic Protected Process
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// http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/system/vista/process_vista.mspx
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// Protected processes allow PROCESS_TERMINATE, which is
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// probably not appropriate for high integrity software.
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static const DWORD dwPoison =
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/*READ_CONTROL |*/ WRITE_DAC | WRITE_OWNER |
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PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS | PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD |
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PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION |
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PROCESS_SET_QUOTA | PROCESS_SET_INFORMATION |
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PROCESS_VM_OPERATION | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_VM_WRITE |
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// In addition to protected process
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PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME | PROCESS_TERMINATE;
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bResult = AddAccessDeniedAce(pDacl, ACL_REVISION, dwPoison, psidArray[0]);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(TRUE == bResult);
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if (FALSE == bResult) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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// Standard and specific rights not explicitly denied
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static const DWORD dwAllowed = ~dwPoison & 0x1FFF;
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bResult = AddAccessAllowedAce(pDacl, ACL_REVISION, dwAllowed, psidArray[1]);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(TRUE == bResult);
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if (FALSE == bResult) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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// Because of ACE ordering, System will effectively have dwAllowed even
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// though the ACE specifies PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS (unless software uses
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// SeDebugPrivilege or SeTcbName and increases access).
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// As an exercise, check behavior of tools such as Process Explorer under XP,
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// Vista, and above. Vista and above should exhibit slightly different behavior
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// due to Restricted tokens.
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bResult = AddAccessAllowedAce(pDacl, ACL_REVISION, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, psidArray[2]);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(TRUE == bResult);
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if (FALSE == bResult) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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// Because of ACE ordering, Administrators will effectively have dwAllowed
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// even though the ACE specifies PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS (unless the Administrator
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// invokes 'discretionary security' by taking ownership and increasing access).
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// As an exercise, check behavior of tools such as Process Explorer under XP,
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// Vista, and above. Vista and above should exhibit slightly different behavior
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// due to Restricted tokens.
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bResult = AddAccessAllowedAce(pDacl, ACL_REVISION, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, psidArray[3]);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(TRUE == bResult);
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if (FALSE == bResult) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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pSecDesc = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(NULL != pSecDesc);
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if (NULL == pSecDesc) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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// InitializeSecurityDescriptor initializes a security descriptor in
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// absolute format, rather than self-relative format. See
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// http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa378863(VS.85).aspx
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bResult = InitializeSecurityDescriptor(pSecDesc, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(TRUE == bResult);
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if (FALSE == bResult) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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bResult = SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(pSecDesc, TRUE, pDacl, FALSE);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(TRUE == bResult);
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if (FALSE == bResult) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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dwResult = SetSecurityInfo(
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GetCurrentProcess(),
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SE_KERNEL_OBJECT, // process object
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OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION | DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
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psidCurUser, // NULL, // Owner SID
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NULL, // Group SID
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pDacl,
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NULL // SACL
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);
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dwResult = GetLastError();
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assert(ERROR_SUCCESS == dwResult);
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if (ERROR_SUCCESS != dwResult) { __leave; /*failed*/ }
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dwResult = ERROR_SUCCESS;
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return GetLastError();
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}
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__finally
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auto freeSid = [] (void* sid)
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{
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if (NULL != pSecDesc)
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if (sid)
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{
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HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, pSecDesc);
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}
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if (NULL != pDacl)
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{
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HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, pDacl);
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FreeSid(reinterpret_cast<PSID>(sid));
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}
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};
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if (psidAdmins)
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{
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FreeSid(psidAdmins);
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}
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if (psidSystem)
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{
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FreeSid(psidSystem);
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}
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if (psidEveryone)
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{
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FreeSid(psidEveryone);
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}
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if (NULL != pTokenInfo)
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{
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HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, pTokenInfo);
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}
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if (NULL != hToken)
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allocator.Reference(hToken, [] (void* hToken)
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{
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if (hToken)
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{
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CloseHandle(hToken);
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}
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});
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DWORD dwSize = 0;
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PVOID pTokenInfo = nullptr;
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if (GetTokenInformation(hToken, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &dwSize) || GetLastError() != ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFER) return GetLastError();
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if (dwSize)
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{
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pTokenInfo = allocator.Allocate(dwSize);
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if (!pTokenInfo) return GetLastError();
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}
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return dwResult;
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if (!GetTokenInformation(hToken, TokenUser, pTokenInfo, dwSize, &dwSize) || !pTokenInfo) return GetLastError();
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PSID psidCurUser = reinterpret_cast<TOKEN_USER*>(pTokenInfo)->User.Sid;
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PSID psidEveryone = nullptr;
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SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY sidEveryone = SECURITY_WORLD_SID_AUTHORITY;
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if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(&sidEveryone, 1, SECURITY_WORLD_RID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &psidEveryone) || !psidEveryone) return GetLastError();
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allocator.Reference(psidEveryone, freeSid);
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PSID psidSystem = nullptr;
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SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY sidSystem = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
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if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(&sidSystem, 1, SECURITY_LOCAL_SYSTEM_RID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &psidSystem) || !psidSystem) return GetLastError();
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allocator.Reference(psidSystem, freeSid);
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PSID psidAdmins = nullptr;
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SID_IDENTIFIER_AUTHORITY sidAdministrators = SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY;
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if (!AllocateAndInitializeSid(&sidAdministrators, 2, SECURITY_BUILTIN_DOMAIN_RID, DOMAIN_ALIAS_RID_ADMINS, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &psidAdmins) || !psidAdmins) return GetLastError();
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allocator.Reference(psidAdmins, freeSid);
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const PSID psidArray[] =
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{
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psidEveryone, /* Deny most rights to everyone */
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psidCurUser, /* Allow what was not denied */
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psidSystem, /* Full control */
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psidAdmins, /* Full control */
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};
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// Determine required size of the ACL
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dwSize = sizeof(ACL);
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// First the DENY, then the ALLOW
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dwSize += GetLengthSid(psidArray[0]);
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dwSize += sizeof(ACCESS_DENIED_ACE) - sizeof(DWORD);
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for (UINT i = 1; i < _countof(psidArray); i++)
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{
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// DWORD is the SidStart field, which is not used for absolute format
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dwSize += GetLengthSid(psidArray[i]);
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dwSize += sizeof(ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE) - sizeof(DWORD);
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}
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PACL pDacl = reinterpret_cast<PACL>(allocator.Allocate(dwSize));
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if (!pDacl || !InitializeAcl(pDacl, dwSize, ACL_REVISION)) return GetLastError();
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// Mimic Protected Process
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// http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/system/vista/process_vista.mspx
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// Protected processes allow PROCESS_TERMINATE, which is
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// probably not appropriate for high integrity software.
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static const DWORD dwPoison =
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/*READ_CONTROL |*/ WRITE_DAC | WRITE_OWNER |
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PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS | PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD |
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PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE | PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION |
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PROCESS_SET_QUOTA | PROCESS_SET_INFORMATION |
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PROCESS_VM_OPERATION | PROCESS_VM_READ | PROCESS_VM_WRITE |
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// In addition to protected process
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PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME | PROCESS_TERMINATE;
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if (!AddAccessDeniedAce(pDacl, ACL_REVISION, dwPoison, psidArray[0])) return GetLastError();
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// Standard and specific rights not explicitly denied
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static const DWORD dwAllowed = ~dwPoison & 0x1FFF;
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if (!AddAccessAllowedAce(pDacl, ACL_REVISION, dwAllowed, psidArray[1])) return GetLastError();
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// Because of ACE ordering, System will effectively have dwAllowed even
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// though the ACE specifies PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS (unless software uses
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// SeDebugPrivilege or SeTcbName and increases access).
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// As an exercise, check behavior of tools such as Process Explorer under XP,
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// Vista, and above. Vista and above should exhibit slightly different behavior
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// due to Restricted tokens.
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if (!AddAccessAllowedAce(pDacl, ACL_REVISION, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, psidArray[2])) return GetLastError();
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// Because of ACE ordering, Administrators will effectively have dwAllowed
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// even though the ACE specifies PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS (unless the Administrator
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// invokes 'discretionary security' by taking ownership and increasing access).
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// As an exercise, check behavior of tools such as Process Explorer under XP,
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// Vista, and above. Vista and above should exhibit slightly different behavior
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// due to Restricted tokens.
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if (!AddAccessAllowedAce(pDacl, ACL_REVISION, PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, psidArray[3])) return GetLastError();
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PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR pSecDesc = allocator.Allocate<SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR>();
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if (!pSecDesc) return GetLastError();
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// InitializeSecurityDescriptor initializes a security descriptor in
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// absolute format, rather than self-relative format. See
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// http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa378863(VS.85).aspx
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if (!InitializeSecurityDescriptor(pSecDesc, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION)) return GetLastError();
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if (!SetSecurityDescriptorDacl(pSecDesc, TRUE, pDacl, FALSE)) return GetLastError();
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return SetSecurityInfo(
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GetCurrentProcess(),
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SE_KERNEL_OBJECT, // process object
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OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION | DACL_SECURITY_INFORMATION,
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psidCurUser, // NULL, // Owner SID
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NULL, // Group SID
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pDacl,
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NULL // SACL
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);
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}
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AntiCheat::AntiCheat()
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@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ namespace Components
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static void PerformCheck();
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static void PatchWinAPI();
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static DWORD ProtectProcess();
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static unsigned long ProtectProcess();
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static void NullSub();
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